Analytical philosophy has had a long but little noted influence on the development of ecological economics. The work of the left Vienna Circle, in particular of Otto Neurath, defended two central claims of ecological economics: first, economics needs to address the various ways in which economic institutions and relations are embedded within the physical world and have ecological preconditions that are a condition of their sustainability; second, reasonable economic and social choices cannot be founded on purely monetary valuations.
Some had the idea to introduce a certain amount of labour as a unit. But how could this make it possible for the excessive exploitation of a coal mine to figure as a negative entry in the balance? How could a quantity of electricity which a river provides us with be entered as an increase in amounts of labour units? Or the increase in wind power used in the running wind mills? (Neurath, 1925 However, similarly, consideration for energy alone fails to properly consider the effects of choice on the quality and quantity of labour time allowed. An economy that was considered with use-values would have no single unit to make comparisons over different plans:
The question might arise, should one protect coal mines or put greater strain on men?
The answer depends for example on whether one thinks that hydraulic power may be sufficiently developed or that solar heat might come to be better used, etc. If one believes the latter, one may 'spend' coal more freely and will hardly waste human effort where coal can be used. If however one is afraid that when one generation uses too much coal thousands will freeze to death in the future, one might use more human power and save coal. Such and many other non-technical matters determine the choice of a technically calculable plan ... we can see no possibility of reducing the production plan to some kind of unit and then to compare the various plans in terms of such units... (Neurath, 1973, 263) To put the argument in more recent terms, decisions across different plans would of necessity need to employ multi-criteria decision tools and judgements. There is no single unit of comparison that will do the work required.
The arguments between Neurath and Mises turn on a number of issues that retain their importance for ecological economics: (1) the limits of market demand as a guide to defensible choices within and between generations; (2) the problems of value incommensurability, and more specifically the adequacy of monetary valuations to capture the goods and losses at stake in both social and environmental choices; (3) the nature of rational choice between different social plans and outcomes.
1. Mises' arguments against socialism claim that, in the absence of markets and private property in the means of production, it is not possible to impute the relative worth of different productive factors on the basis of consumer valuations. Neurath's rejection of the imputation problem in this form is in part a rejection of the claim that valuations of current consumers provide an adequate basis for judging the relative values of different uses of productive factors. A major distinctive feature of Neurath's contribution was the explicit introduction of intergenerational concerns. Not only was it the case that, as socialists had long noted, within any generation the social well-being of actors who lack monetary means disappears from social choices, it was also the case that across generations, the well-being of future generations who are necessarily absent from current markets cannot be directly captured in market exchange. Intergenerational decision making could not be left to market mechanisms. Nor could alternatives like labour time units do the job. It required socially informed multi-criteria decision making procedures that included the full range of the dimensions of well-being and domains of affected agents to be included.
2. Neurath's arguments here are based on assumptions about the incommensurability of the different dimensions of human well-being. Neurath argues that no monetary measure, or indeed any other single measure, is able to capture changes in well-being. Welfare concepts, such as the standard of living, are multidimensional: 'The attempts to characterize the standard of living are like those which try to characterize the "state of health". Both are multidimensional structures ' (1937/2004: 520) . The point is one that Neurath had already made in an early lecture which rejected the possibility of units of pleasure providing such a metric for utilitarianism (1912) . This claim that the standard of living is multidimensional is combined with a second claim, that the measures of these different dimensions of well-being cannot themselves be treated as separable items that can be added: ' We cannot regard [the standard of living] as a weight made up of the sum of the weights of the various parts' (1937/2004: 516) . Choices between options are a matter not of assessing the value of different dimensions and then adding them to coming to an aggregate score, but rather considering each 'as a whole. ' (1909: 244) . Neurath took the knowledge that informs decision making to be uncertain and incomplete, and even given what is known, the norms of rationality rarely determine a unique answer. A proper rationalist recognizes the boundaries of the power of reason in arriving at decisions: 'Rationalism sees its chief triumph in the clear recognition of the limits of actual insight' (1913/1983) . It is a mark of the pseudorationalist to believe that there exist technical rules of choice that determine optimal answers to all decisions including those about resources.
No such decision procedure exists. Thus, to employ again his environmental examples, given a choice between alternative sources of energysay coal and hydraulic power or solar energya variety of ethical and political judgements, for example about inter-generational equity and the distribution of risks, comes into play. One cannot arrive at some optimal outcome through some technical procedure employing some single unit, either monetary or non-monetary.
These disputed assumptions about rationality also figure in the important differences between the contributions of Weber and Mises to the socialist calculation debates. Weber's criticisms of Neurath and the possibility of rational calculation in socialism parallel some of those by Mises. However, his contribution is marked by a distinction that is absent in Mises' argument, that between formal and substantive rationality. It is this distinction that grounds Kapp's assertion of Weber's importance to the debates. 3 Weber drew the distinction as follows:
The term 'formal rationality of economic action' is used to designate the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied. The 'substantive rationality', on the other hand, is the degree to which the provisioning of a given group of persons (no matter how delimited) with goods is shaped by economically orientated social action under some criterion … of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of these ends (1921-22/1978: 85) On this account then an economic system is 'formally' rational 'according to the degree in which the provision for needs, which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, and is so expressed' (ibid.). Like Mises, Weber took money-based economy to be required for formal rationality within any complex changing economy: 'From a purely technical point of view, money is the most "perfect" means of economic calculation. That is, it is formally the most rational means of orienting economic activity. Calculation in terms of money, and not its actual use, is thus the 3 For useful a discussion of the influence of Weber and the later Menger on Kapp, see Berger (2008) . specific means of instrumentally rational economic provision.' (ibid.: 86; italics indicate a term restored. We owe to Christian Scholz the observation that in the English translation by Talcott Parsons still being used, the word 'instrumental' is absent, undermining the actual meaning of the statement. In the original German version Weber speaks explicitly of 'Zweckrationalität' (instrumental rationality) (1921-22/1972: 45) .)
A Neurathian economy in kind, Weber argued, would be inferior to a market economy in terms of its formal rationality. However, Weber, unlike Mises, allowed that this does not rule out criticisms of market economies in terms of their substantive rationality according to some wider ends in which the '"purely formal" rationality of calculation in monetary terms is of quite secondary importance or even is fundamentally inimical to their respective ultimate ends' (1921-22/1978: 86) . Mises' argument contrasts with Weber's in assuming that formal instrumental rationality exhausts the scope of rationality in economic activity, a difference obliterated by the available translation (as noted).
The distinction between the types of rationalities is central to later ecological economics. It is the reason why the debate between Neurath and Weber was taken by Kapp to be so central to understanding the failures of standard economic analysis of environmental problems. The failure of standard economic analysis of the economy in terms of monetary exchange and the attempt to catch all values within monetary prices is that it is concerned only with the formal rationality of the economy and not its substantive rationality (Kapp, 1963 (Kapp, /1977 . The importance of the contributions of Neurath and Weber lies precisely in the focus of one, Neurath, on the need for multiple non-monetary measures of human wellbeing and his acknowledgement of the physical embeddedness of the economy on wider environmental conditions, and of the other, Weber, on the claim that while markets may be superior to other economic systems in terms of formal calculability, this is independent of the question of whether they are substantively rational. The later debates get sidetracked since they concern simply questions of different models of economic calculability, of whether socialist economies can match the formal rationality of capitalism. The importance of the environment for Kapp lies in the way it highlights the need for economics to focus again on problems that concerned the original debates between Neurath and Weber:
The challenge to economics is due to the complexity of the causal chain which gives rise to environmental disruption and the magnitude of the social costs. These defy any treatment in terms of such traditional concepts as 'externalities', GNP, etc.and, moreover , put in question the validity of our traditional measures of efficiency and optimalization by economic units or subsystems of the economy. The answer to this challenge will have to be found not by means of formal welfare criteria but in terms of concepts defining a substantive rationality reflecting actual human needs and requirements of human life. (Kapp, 1970: 847) Kapp's own programme of research can be called broadly Neurathian. Well-being should be conceptualized in terms of a series of 'existential minima representing minimum adequate levels of satisfaction of essential human needs.' (Kapp, 1965: 77) . Indicators of those minima and the specification of the physical and social conditions for meeting those minima should form the object of both decision making and the comparative judgements of different social organizations. 4 4 There are also clear differences between Kapp and Neurath. Kapp operates within an objective state account of well-being, whereas Neurath remains Epicurean, concerned with subjective states. However, in practice the approaches converge. Neurath's own measures are concerned with the objective measures of the conditions of life. Kapp also acknowledges with the Vienna Circle the need for an approach that brings together different disciplines into such choices, although he rejects the specific models of the unity of the sciences offered by Neurath and Carnap (see Kapp, 1988: 60-64 ).
Neurath and Hayek: political economy and epistemology 5
The problems about the nature and scope of rational choices that were central to the debates between Neurath and Mises were also central to Neurath's debates with Hayek. Hayek's criticisms of Neurath, like those of Mises, address themes that have been central to ecological economics. His arguments aim in part against in natura calculation, calculation in kind.
However, Hayek's arguments against Neurath also raise wider and distinct epistemic themes.
These themes about the nature and limits of science in decision making mattered not just in his debate with Hayek, but also in the debate with very different participantsthe Frankfurt Schoolto be discussed later in this chapter. Both started from criticisms of the scientism that Neurath is taken to exhibit.
Hayek's papers 'The counter-revolution of science' and 'Scientism and the study of society' (Hayek, 1941 1942 -44/1979 For further discussion see Martínez-Alier (1987). objectivism' typical of an engineering mentality. Their objectivism is exhibited in their belief in the desirability for calculations in kind in economic choices as against calculations in monetary valuations (Hayek, 1942-44/1979: 90 and 171) . The work of Neurath becomes a primary target of Hayek's criticism, since in his work objectivism, socialism and in natura calculation most clearly come together: 'The most persistent advocate of … in natura calculation is, significantly, Dr. Otto Neurath, the protagonist of modern "physicalism" and "objectivism"' (ibid.: 170).
Neurath responded to these criticisms in a set of unpublished notes and letters to
Hayek in 1945 which Neurath had hoped would form the basis for a public exchange (Neurath, 1945) . The public exchange never occurred. Neurath died in late 1945 and it is difficult to discern in Hayek's letters much enthusiasm for the exchange.
Hayek claimed that scientism in the social sciences provides a central example of an illusion about the scope of human reason and knowledge that underpins the socialist project.
The doctrine of 'objectivism', typified in Neurath's 'physicalism', is an exemplar of such scientism. The terms 'objectivism' and its opposite 'subjectivism' are used in a variety of logically independent senses within the Austrian economic tradition. 7 In Hayek's scientism essay, 'subjectivism' is used primarily to capture a hermeneutic thesis about the nature of social objects, that they are in part constituted by beliefs and social meanings. The objects of the social sciences are constituted by beliefs and ideas that individuals have about them: 'Neither a "commodity" or an "economic good", nor "food" or "money" can be defined in physical terms but only in terms of views people hold about things.' (1942-44/1979: 53) .
Objectivism, by contrast, is the view that such references to mental states can and should be eliminated. Hayek asserted that the demand that social science requires the elimination of all terms that cannot be given a characterization in a purely physical language characterizes Neurath's physicalist programme (ibid.: 78).
The doctrines of objectivism and physicalism, Hayek claimed, provide support for the belief in the possibility of 'in natura' calculations in economics discussed in the last section.
Objectivism is expressed in 'the characteristic and ever-recurrent demand for the substitution of in natura calculation for the 'artificial' calculation in terms of price or value, that is, of a calculation which takes explicit account of the objective properties of things' (ibid.: 170).
The central political implication of Hayek's arguments against objectivism is the denial of the existence of any physical units for planning economic production, including the energy units offered by earlier precursors of ecological economics such as Ballod-Atlanticus, Popper-Lynkeus, Ostwald, Soddy and Solvay (ibid.: 90-91). Hayek rejected the eliminativist physicalist claim that all economic activities 'can be ultimately reduced to quantities of energy, [and] man should in his plans treat the various things...as the interchangeable units of abstract energy which they "really" are.' (ibid.: 91). However, Hayek, in rejecting objectivism, also defended a logically independent, stronger and less plausible form of subjectivism that inverts the physicalist eliminativism he criticized. He rejected 'the more widespread… conception of the "objective" possibilities of production, of the quantity of social output which the physical facts are supposed to make possible' (ibid.: 91).
The belief in objectivism and in natura calculation is for Hayek an expression of an illusion about the scope of knowledge and reason that is typical of the social engineer. The belief in the realizability of a technical optimum, derived from the notion of objective possibilities of production, represents an illusion since it fails to acknowledge the limits of knowledge that any particular individual can possess.
The application of the engineering technique to the whole of society requires…that the director possess the same complete knowledge of the whole society that the engineer possesses of his limited world. Central economic planning is nothing but such an application of engineering principles to the whole of society based on the assumption that such a complete concentration of all relevant knowledge is possible. (ibid.: 173)
Objectivism and the belief in in natura calculation involve a commitment to the possibility of complete knowledge that Hayek rejects in his epistemological arguments against planning and in defence of the market.
The belief in planning involves an erroneous belief in the omnipotence of reason, a belief that Hayek variously calls 'rationalism', 'superrationalism' and 'Cartesian rationalism'.
Against such rationalism Hayek claims 'it may … prove to be far the most difficult and not the least important task for human reason rationally to comprehend its own limitations' (ibid.: 162).
What are the sources of human ignorance to which this argument appeals? The first is what
Hayek calls 'the division of knowledge' in society, that is, the dispersal of knowledge and skills throughout different individuals in society. While Hayek framed the argument in terms of the division of knowledge in society, the key to his argument is the nature of the knowledge dispersed: practical knowledge embodied in skills and know-how that cannot be articulated in propositional form, and knowledge of particulars, local to time and place. Such knowledge cannot be passed on to a central planning body but remains inevitably dispersed throughout society. The market alone is claimed to solve this epistemic problem. The market acts as a coordinating procedure which, through the price mechanism, distributes to different actors that information that is relevant for the coordination of their plans (1937; 1942-44/1979: 176-7; 1945) .
Central to that coordination is the activity of the entrepreneur who is alert to new opportunities in the market place but who is faced with a second source of ignorance, a future that at the point of decision is unpredictable. Wants change with the invention and production of new objects for consumption. Since the progress of human knowledge is in principle unpredictableif we could predict future knowledge, we would already have itand since human invention relies on the progress of knowledge, future human wants are also in principle unpredictable (Hayek, 1942 (Hayek, -44/1979 1960: 40-41; cf. Popper, 1944-45) . The market is presented as a discovery procedure in which different hypotheses about the future are embodied in entrepreneurial acts and tested (Hayek, 1978: 179-90; cf. Kirzner, 1985) .
Given this view of the price system as a solution to the problem of ignorance, to give up prices for calculation in kind is to give up a solution to the problem of ignorance for the illusion of the possibility of complete knowledge required for central planning. There is no in natura alternative to the monetary measures. If Hayek is right, this is not just a criticism of socialist planning. It is a criticism of the wider tradition of ecological economics, which is concerned with the physical preconditions of economic activity and in particular its ecological preconditions, and which does defend the use of non-monetary measures and indicators of economic activity.
Neurath noted at the outset of his reply to Hayek that there is no dispute about whether he defends either physicalism or in natura calculation. What is in dispute is whether
Hayek properly characterizes either and whether, once properly stated, they are open to the objections that he presents. Much of Neurath's response to Hayek is taken up with clarification of the meaning of physicalism. 8 'Physicalism' in its basic sense refers to the 8 For a detailed discussion of the concept of physicalism, of its evolution and defensibility throughout the protocol sentence debate in the Vienna circle during the 1930s, see Uebel (2007a) ; of its role for Neurath in social science, see Uebel (2007b) . In this chapter we will limit our discussion of the doctrine that all statements in the sciences, social sciences and everyday life should be controllable by sentences whose terms refer to spatio-temporal particulars. In the context of his debate with Hayek, the significant point is that physicalism in the sense that Neurath employed was not the view that all the sciences could be reduced to physics, nor that all the terms of language could be translated into those of physics. Neurath's approach to sociology is not physicalist in the sense that Hayek outlines and his physicalism is not committed to the elimination of all 'intentional' vocabulary or mental terms from social science. Moreover, Neurath's social theory is institutionalist. It is a form of (non-eliminativist) social behaviourism which takes public institutions and social orders as the starting point for analysis. Hence, for example, his insistence that monetary exchanges be understood as parts of particular institutional arrangements like others and their study to be approached anthropologically. In developing the point, Neurath exploited the now well-trodden analogies between monetary exchange and games like chess which are constituted by certain public rules (1944: 39) .
Clarification of the senses of 'physicalism' matters to the debate about the possibility of in natura calculation. Because Hayek mischaracterized Neurath's physicalism, much in Neurath's account of in natura calculation is untouched by many of Hayek's criticisms. The doctrine that Hayek criticized is that there are some purely physical units, like units of energy, which are independent of human use or belief and which could be employed for planning. But not only did Neurath not defend physicalism in this sense, he similarly rejected the doctrine that there are purely physical units that could be employed for socialist planning and with it the technocratic idea that there is any optimum solution to social problems.
Neurath opposed 'what is called the "technocratic movement"', which assumes there exists:
concept of physicalism to clarification of its role in the debate with Hayek about the nature and possibility of in natura calculation. one best solution with its 'optimum happiness', with its 'optimum population', with its 'optimum health', with its 'optimum working week', with its 'optimum productivity' or something else of this kind [and which] asks for a particular authority which should be exercised by technicians and other experts in selecting 'big plans'. (1942/1973: 426-7) A number of points about the elements of in natura calculation deserve notice here.
First, they are plural. Second, they are not purely 'physical' in the sense that Hayek assumes.
The material preconditions of human activity do feature in Neurath's account of in-kind calculations. But so also do the social dimensions of life. The inventory of the conditions of life includes 'everything about work load, morbidity, mortality, food, clothing, housing, educational possibilities, amusement, leisure time etc. ' (1925/2004: 421) . It includes 'the environment in its broadest sense ' (1937/2004: 524) . In discussing real wealth, Neurath was not abstracting from human relations and human conditions. Correspondingly, institutional arrangements matter: self-government and freedom and other human relations belong to the 'happiness conditions' of human beings (1942/1973: 427 ). Neurath's account of in natura decision making is consistent with the institutionalist character of his approach to economics and social science in general.
Neurath's rejection of the forms of technocratic reason that Hayek ascribes to him forms the basis of much of his response to Hayek. For Neurath, the belief in some kind of technical optimum discoverable through science is a mark of pseudorationalism. Indeed (Neurath, 1945) .
In his correspondence with Hayek, Neurath linked the rejection of pseudorationalism with his logical empiricism. Thus he invokes a series of claims about science that he was in part responsible for placing at the centre of the philosophy and sociology of science. Scientific theory is underdetermined by empirical evidence. Evidence itself is uncertain and provisionalobservation or protocol statements are open to revision. Theories are a mass of statements that are logically interconnected and confront the world as a whole, not individually. In the metaphor he uses in a variety of different places, we are like sailors who have to patch up their boat at sea. There are no methods or rules of science that can be employed to definitively confirm or falsify theories.
A sign of pseudorationalism is the failure to acknowledge the underdetermination of theory by evidence and uncertainty in prediction. Neither can such uncertainty and ignorance be resolved by treating them as if they could be translated into quantifiable probability statements (1941: 147-8) . This general scepticism about predictability is taken by Neurath to have particular relevance when it comes to social decision making. The unpredictability in science in general underpins his rejection of the technocratic ideal of the discovery of an optimal solution to social decisions we noted earlier:
If science enables us to make more than one sound prediction, how may we use science as a means of action? We can never avoid a 'decision', because no account would be able to show us one action as 'the best', no computation would present us with any 'optimum', whatever actions have to be discussed. (Neurath, 1946 Neurath also appealed to the very features of the unpredictability of human knowledge that were central to Popper's case against historicism and Hayek's view of the market as a discovery procedure. It is a feature of human knowledge and invention that we cannot predict what will be novel, and since social change depends in part on theoretical and practical invention, we cannot predict social change (1943/2004: 527) . This point was also central to the final sections of his Foundations of the Social Sciences where its implications are stressed in the closing remark which returns to his analogy for the development of knowledge, that scientists are like sailors at sea who cannot put into dock but must modify the ship with materials at hand: 'A new ship grows out of the old one, step by stepand while they are still building, the sailors may already be thinking of a new structure, and they will not always agree with one another. The whole business will go in a way we cannot even anticipate today. That is For an account of the uses and contexts of the simile of the sailors throughout Neurath's work see Cartwright et al. (1996: 89-166) . advantages of that approach against attempts to reduce choices to single monetary units through a cost-benefit analysis. 11 Finally, note that, for Neurath, ignorance and unpredictability are universal features of social choice:
Professor von Hayek thinks people think too much of the society as a factory, as if we were able to predict so much better in a factory. I want to stress the point that in the factory we are not able to predict as comprehensively as Professor von Hayek thinks.
I have to over -Hayek Professor Hayek: [there] we are not in a position of comprehensive prediction either. (Neurath, 1945) The problem of decision making in conditions of uncertainty is a general feature of social life. As he had put it years earlier, all action is 'an anticipation of unpredictable events' (Neurath, 1921 . For further discussion see Martínez-Alier et al. (1998) and (1999) . required for resource provision, waste assimilation, climate regulation and so on. In making claims about the physical conditions for economic and social provisioning, the approach draws on both the natural sciences and social sciences. The historical origins of this approach in the work of Neurath and the left Vienna Circle, and later in Kapp, we have noted above.
On the other side is a body of work in political ecology which takes environmental problems to have a cultural origin in a crisis of 'Western reason'. This approach is sceptical of science in that scientific reason itself is taken to be a form of ideology responsible for the domination The co-presence of Horkheimer's paper with that of a leading logical empiricist may appear surprising until the wider context is appreciated. For all their early philosophical differences, which were substantial, there existed many actual and potential points of contact between the early interdisciplinary materialism of the Frankfurt School and the radical physicalist sociology of writers like Neurath. Indeed, that journal issue was preceded by a number of meetings and some partial cooperation. However, this is not to say there were no surprises in the co-presence of the two papers. For Neurath himself, the strength,
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For a detailed discussion of this episode see O'Neill and Uebel (2005). uncharitableness and polemical nature of Horkheimer's critique did come as an unwelcome surprise: he had no idea that such a confrontation was planned but had hoped for a further narrowing of their differences. In reply he wrote a deliberately understated and remarkably unpolemical response for publication in the journal. This response Horkheimer refused to publish. Not surprisingly, further contact between the Frankfurt School and members of the former Vienna Circle was minimal. The materialism of Horkheimer's earlier work has some affinities to the form of empiricism defended by Neurath, just as Neurath's Marxism had meant that his account of physicalism was much more sympathetic to materialism than others in the Vienna Circle. Both Neurath's and the early Horkheimer's work were concerned with developing a programme that might be characterized as materialism without metaphysics. For both, while it did not entail any ethical position, their materialist attitude was associated with a particular set of political and ethical concerns reflecting their shared Marxist assumptions. Both held that a rejection of metaphysics had ethical implications in so far as it ruled out any appeal to abstractions that were separate from the particular lives of particular human beings. While for Neurath it involved a commitment to a politics on 'the earthly plane ' (1928/1973: 295) , for 15 This now canonical periodization was developed by Dubiel (1978) .
Horkheimer materialism 'opposes every attempt to play down the importance of insight into the earthly order of things by turning man's attention to a supposedly more essential order' (1933/1972: 26) . Horkheimer granted a partial overlap with positivism in their common opposition to the use of metaphysics to reconcile individuals to their fate in existing social orders (ibid.: 6).
The papers of 1937 saw a shift in Horkheimer's views towards the more influential critique of scientific reason and with it a marked alteration in the conception of the role of philosophy. Philosophy becomes a resource that has to be distanced from science, since it is not just the social context in which science operates that is now taken as the central critical concern, but the nature and telos of science itself. Virtually inverting the view which animated the early materialist work, philosophy wholly separate from the sciences becomes the central source of Critical Theory. This shift becomes still more pronounced in the third phase of the Frankfurt School's work in which the earlier interdisciplinary programme is altogether abandoned.
During the second phase Horkheimer's philosophical reflection increasingly focused on the role of science in the productive processes of industrial capitalist societies and on the ideological role of philosophies of science. Science was viewed as a form of knowledge that was constituted by an interest in the manipulation of its object for productive ends.
What scientists in various fields regard as the essences of theory thus corresponds, in fact, to the immediate tasks they set for themselves. The manipulation of physical nature and of specific economic and social mechanisms demand alike the amassing of a body of knowledge such as is supplied by an ordered set of hypotheses. The technological advances of the bourgeois period are inseparably linked to this function of the pursuit of science. (1937b/1972: 194) One of the marks of 'traditional' as opposed to 'critical' theory was taken to be the lack of self-consciousness of this fact. Thus traditional theory takes the particular form of scientific knowledge as given: 'the real social function of science is not made manifest' (ibid.: 197) . Unconsciously, the scientist renders invisible his or her own role in reproducing existing society, thereby ensuring 'the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs ' (ibid.: 196) . One particular scientific conception of theory is treated in an unhistorical way and in doing so becomes 'a reified, ideological character ' (ibid.: 194) .
Logical positivism on this account is but a particular expression of a conservative ideology.
This, and the claim that science is committed by its very nature to a purely instrumental understanding of its object, became central not only to the later work of the Frankfurt School Horkheimer to Neurath 29 December 1937 , in Horkheimer (1995 .
The problem became increasingly apparent as Horkheimer's criticisms of the concept of reason that informed the Enlightenment project became more radical. Thus in Eclipse of Reason, reason as such is taken to be based in an interest in the domination of nature: 'The disease of reason is that reason was born from man's urge to dominate nature, and the "recovery" depends on insight into the nature of the original idea, not on a cure of the latest symptoms. ' (1947/1974: 176) . However, in developing his critique of reason, Horkheimer does not want to reject the norms of reason as such. The critique is a 'self-critique': 'in such self-critique, reason will at the same time remain faithful to itself ' (ibid.: 177) . But how can such a radical self-critique of reason be sustained without undermining the grounds of the critique? As Habermas later put it, 'the radical critique of reason proceeds self-referentially; critique cannot simultaneously be radical and leave its own criteria untouched ' (1986/1993: 57) . Horkheimer rejected any turn to irrationalism and held on to the critical role of reasonbut without offering a defensible account of how it survives its own self-criticism.
The radical critique of reason left a problematic legacy for the Frankfurt School just where it is most influential in political ecologyin their critique of science. Part of the problem in the identification of science with instrumental reason lies in the lack of clarity in what overcoming instrumental reason is taken to involve. The problems are clearly apparent, for example, in Marcuse's influential account of science as ideology. Marcuse repeats the strong claim about the relation of science and the domination of nature: 'science, by virtue of its own method and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man ' (1968: 135) . But Marcuse, unlike Horkheimer and Adorno, did not give up on the idea of radical social change. Thus he found himself forced to claim that the end of domination requires a new science grounded in a different interest, and with a different view of nature, not as an object to be manipulated but as 'a totality of life to be protected and cultivated ' (1972: 61) . This change in the interests of science would carry with it changes in its content: 'Its hypotheses, without losing their rational character, would develop in an essentially different experimental context (that of a pacified world); consequently, science would arrive at essentially different concepts of nature and establish essentially different facts. ' (1968: 136 A related difficulty is also apparent, albeit in a very different way, in the work of Habermas. Habermas, while accepting the claim that scientific knowledge is constituted by an interest in technical control, rejects the idea that this limitation can be overcome: 'The idea of a New Science will not stand up to logical scrutiny... ' (1968/1970: 88) Habermas's assumption of equality of competence that is built into the model of communicative rationality fails to acknowledge the existence of epistemic inequality even in the ideal conditions of his non-coercive speech community. While the assumption of epistemic equality may have power in the moral domain, it is implausible in that of the sciences. As a result Habermas's account is forced to gloss over some of the real difficulties 17 This is a constant in Habermas' work ever since his 1963 book.
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For a discussion of this claim see O'Neill (2002) . about the role of science in modern public life, in particular that of simultaneous reliance on expertise coupled with proper scepticism about its claims. Yet it is just in this context that the official opponent of the Frankfurt School, Neurath, speaks most clearly.
Evidence of Neurath's scepticism about the technocratic movement can also be found in both of the key papers in Neurath's engagement with the Frankfurt School, in 'Inventory' and in his unpublished reply to Horkheimer. In the first, Neurath develops a theme that was central to his contributions to the socialist calculation debate, the rejection of any single measure, monetary or non-monetary, through which one could arrive at a technically optimal social outcome. Alongside this specific argument from the incommensurability of different options, Neurath's rejection of technocratic accounts of social choice is also founded on a more general set of arguments against the view of theoretical and practical reason involved.
Those arguments have their basis in the kind of sceptical naturalistic reflection on science that Neurath reiterated in his response to Horkheimer: the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence; theories as bodies of logically interconnected statements which confront the world as a whole, not individually; the uncertainty and provisionality even of observation statements. This fallibilism itself has to be understood naturalistically in terms of the history and sociology of science. It was reflections about the nature of scientific knowledge that founded Neurath's scepticism about excessive claims for the role of science and technical expertise in offering unique determinate answers to problems and his rejection of assumptions about knowledge that underpins the 'technocratic movement' with its various claims about optimal social decision making.
The problems of choice in conditions of necessarily uncertain and incomplete knowledge are not new. However, they are becoming increasingly to the fore in ecological problems. So also is the recognition of the problem that our decision making needs at the same time to both rely on scientific expertise and be open to proper scepticism about its limits: 'Our life is connected more and more with experts, but on the other hand, we are less prepared to accept other people's judgements, when making decisions' (Neurath, 1996: 251) .
There is no permanent solution to such conflictswhile institutional conditions for social trust are important, scepticism of expertise is not something to be eliminated. Democracy is 'the continual struggle between the expert… and the common man' (ibid.). Democratic deliberative processes are in part about ways of living with that conflict and guarding against the recurrent dangers of technocratic pseudorationalism. 19 The naturalistic scepticism which So while there is nothing in Neurath's work that approaches a detailed account of public deliberation, the theory of deliberative democracy that arises out of the work of Habermas could do with a reconciliation with the forgotten heritage of his precursors' 'positivist' opponents. At the level of public science policy, the two traditions of political ecology have much to say to each other. 20 Here too, we believe, political ecology can only gain from continuing to build on the input of the analytical philosopher who helped shape its foundations.
19
On the wider contemporary relevance of Neurath's mature writings on social organization, see O'Neill (1998 : Postscript), (2003a ) and (2003b .
20
There remain, of course, deep conflicts between the social Epicurianism of Neurath, which was deeply anti-Kantian and the reformulation of a Kantian ethic by Habermasalthough a similar conflict exists within the Frankfurt tradition between discourse ethics and the early materialism of Horkheimer.
